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Human cooperation may partly depend on the presence of individuals willing to incur personal costs to
punish noncooperators. The psychological factors that motivate such ‘altruistic punishment’ are not fully
understood; some have argued that altruistic punishment is a deliberate act of norm enforcement that
requires self-control, while others claim that it is an impulsive act driven primarily by emotion. In the
current study, we addressed this question by examining the relationship between impulsive choice and
altruistic punishment in the ultimatum game. As the neurotransmitter serotonin has been implicated in
both impulsive choice and altruistic punishment, we investigated the effects of manipulating serotonin on
both measures. Across individuals, impulsive choice and altruistic punishment were correlated and
increased following serotonin depletion. These findings imply that altruistic punishment reflects the
absence rather than the presence of self control, and suggest that impulsive choice and altruistic
punishment share common neural mechanisms.
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Unlike most other species, humans cooperate in large groups,
with strangers they are unlikely to encounter again, and often in the
absence of immediate external reinforcement. Recent work in
economics and evolutionary biology suggests that these aspects of
human cooperation are driven in part by the presence of individ-
uals willing to incur personal costs to punish noncooperators (Fehr
& Gachter, 2002). Such ‘altruistic punishment’ has been observed
across diverse human societies (Henrich et al., 2006) and poses a
puzzle: why do people punish noncooperators despite the fact that
such actions are personally costly?
The psychological root of altruistic punishment has been de-
bated. Some have suggested that altruistic punishment is a delib-
erate act of social norm enforcement that requires self-control
(Knoch & Fehr, 2007; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, &
Fehr, 2006). Others claim the opposite: that altruistic punishment
is an impulsive act driven primarily by emotional reactions to
perceived unfairness (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007; Pillutla & Mur-
nighan, 1996; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003;
Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). In the current study, we
address this question by directly examining whether altruistic
punishment behavior correlates positively or negatively with im-
pulsive choice, an independent measure of self-control in the
context of decision-making. In addition, we examined whether
impulsive choice and altruistic punishment were modulated in
similar or different ways by changes in serotonin, a neurotrans-
mitter implicated both in self-control and social decision-making.
We measured altruistic punishment behavior using the Ultima-
tum Game (UG). In this game, two players must agree to share a
sum of money, or neither player gets any money. One player, the
proposer, suggests a way to split the sum. The other player, the
responder, either accepts the offer and both players are paid
accordingly, or rejects the offer and neither player is paid. Despite
the fact that rejecting an offer means forfeiting payment, respond-
ers tend to punish proposers who violate fairness norms by reject-
ing their unfair offers (usually less than 20 to 30% of the total
stake) (Guth, Schmittberger, & Scwarze, 1982). Thus, rejecting
unfair offers in the UG is an example of “costly” or “altruistic”
punishment. Note that the “cost” of punishment refers to the
potential earning that the responder could have otherwise earned.
Proponents of the self-control account of altruistic punishment
behavior argue that responders in the UG are tempted to selfishly
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http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.accept all offers and must exercise self-control to enforce fairness
goals and reject unfair offers. Evidence from neuroeconomics has
implicated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a brain
region implicated in self-control (Miller & Cohen, 2001), in the
implementation of these fairness goals. The DLPFC is activated
when responders decide whether to reject unfair offers in the UG
(Sanfey et al., 2003), and disrupting DLPFC activity with trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation reduces rejection of unfair offers,
suggesting that the DLPFC normally promotes rejection of unfair
offers (Knoch et al., 2006).
In contrast, supporters of the emotional hypothesis of altruistic
punishment behavior point out that self-reported anger predicts
whether individuals reject unfair offers in the UG (Pillutla & Mur-
nighan, 1996), and inducing negative affect increases the rate of
rejection of unfair offers (Harle & Sanfey, 2007). Moreover, increased
physiological arousal in response to unfair offers in the UG magnifies
the likelihood of rejection (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman,
2006), as does activity in the insula (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et
al., 2008), a brain region linked to negative emotional states (Calder,
Lawrence, & Young, 2001). In the context of the UG, these emotional
reactions to unfair offers result in monetary loss. Avoiding these
losses involves “swallowing one’s pride” and accepting unfair offers,
foregoing the opportunity to punish unfair proposers by rejecting their
offers. Self-control, rather than facilitating altruistic punishment, may
instead be employed to promote long-term material self-interest by
overriding the emotional impulse to punish. Supporting this view, two
recent studies reported greater activity in the right ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex (VLPFC), another brain region implicated in self-
control (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Cohen & Lieberman, in
press), when participants accept unfair offers in the UG (Halko,
Hlushchuk, Hari, & Schurmann, 2009; Tabibnia et al., 2008). In-
creased activity in right VLPFC during acceptance of unfair offers
was associated with reduced activity in the insula, suggesting that the
decision to forego altruistic punishment may involve down-regulating
the negative emotional response to unfair treatment (Tabibnia et al.,
2008). According to this view, then, succumbing to the desire to
engage in altruistic punishment represents a breakdown of self-
regulation.
Because activity in brain regions associated with self-control
has been observed both during the decision to engage in altruistic
punishment (Sanfey et al., 2003) and the decision to refrain from
it (Halko et al., 2009; Tabibnia et al., 2008), these studies cannot
resolve the question of whether altruistic punishment in the UG
reflects the presence or absence of self-control; and no behavioral
study has directly examined whether altruistic punishment reflects
the presence or absence of self-control. The first aim of the current
study was to examine whether individual differences in self-
control in the context of decision-making, assessed using a well-
validated measure of impulsive choice, were related to individual
differences in the tendency to engage in altruistic punishment.
We measured individual differences in impulsive choice using
the delay-discounting task (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999), in
which subjects make a series of choices between a small reward
available immediately, and a larger reward available after a delay.
Individuals who prefer small immediate rewards on this measure
(i.e., choose impulsively) are more likely to suffer from disorders
of self-control in the real world, such as drug addiction, obesity,
and pathological gambling (Bickel et al., 2007; Petry, 2001; Reyn-
olds, 2006; Weller, Cook, Avsar, & Cox, 2008). Research in
behavioral neuroscience (Evenden, 1999; Winstanley et al., 2004)
and psychology (Kirby & Finch, 2010; Patton et al., 1995; Reyn-
olds et al., 2006) indicates that impulsivity is a complex construct
with many facets or ‘varieties’, including impulsive choice (in-
ability to wait), motor impulsivity (favoring speed over accuracy),
and attentional impulsivity (high distractibility), among others,
with similarly distinct neural and neurochemical substrates. For the
current study, we chose to focus specifically on impulsive choice
because of its external ecological validity as a measure of self-
control (Bickel et al., 2007; Petry, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Weller,
Cook, Avsar, & Cox, 2008) and its clear relevance in the context
of decision-making (Kirby & Finch, 2010; Reynolds et al., 2006).
A recent hierarchical component analysis of impulsivity in fact
found that performance on the discounting task correlated with
multiple components of impulsivity (Kirby & Finch, 2010).
To examine whether altruistic punishment in the UG reflects the
presence or absence of self-control, we correlated individual dif-
ferences in impulsive choice on the delay-discounting task with
individual differences in altruistic punishment in the UG. If altru-
istic punishment requires self-control, these measures should be
negatively correlated; if altruistic punishment reflects emotional
reactions to perceived unfairness, these measures should be posi-
tively correlated.
As a second test of whether altruistic punishment in the UG is an
act of self-control, we observed the effects of manipulating the neu-
rotransmitter serotonin on both altruistic punishment in the UG and
impulsive choice in the delay-discounting task. Serotonin has been
suggested to promote self-control in general (Carver, Johnson, &
Joormann, 2008), and disrupting serotonin function reduces self-
control on a variety of measures, including delay-discounting (Mobini
et al., 2000; Schweighofer et al., 2008). Showing that impulsive
choice and altruistic punishment are not only correlated, but similarly
influenced in tandem by serotonin, would provide even stronger
evidence that these two measures capture common psychological
processes.
Twenty-two healthy volunteers attended two experimental ses-
sions, at least 1 week apart. In one session, they underwent acute
tryptophan depletion, a procedure that temporarily lowers brain
serotonin levels by limiting the availability of tryptophan, the
amino acid precursor to serotonin (Carpenter et al., 1998; Cooper,
Bloom, & Roth, 2003). In the other session, they received a
placebo treatment that did not alter serotonin levels. On each visit,
participants completed the delay-discounting task and played the
role of responder in the UG. We previously reported that lowering
serotonin in this sample increased altruistic punishment in the UG
(Crockett et al., 2008). In line with previous findings (Schweig-
hofer et al., 2008), we predicted that lowering serotonin would
increase impulsive choice on the delay-discounting task, and that
changes in impulsive choice induced by tryptophan depletion
would correlate with changes in altruistic punishment induced by
tryptophan depletion.
Method
Participants
Twenty-two healthy volunteers (7 men, mean age  25.7)
participated. Blood samples were unavailable for two subjects.
Exclusion criteria included history of cardiac, hepatic, renal, pul-
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medication/drug use, and personal or family history of major
depression or bipolar affective disorder. Participants were finan-
cially compensated for participating. Additional data collected in
this sample have been reported elsewhere (Crockett et al., 2008;
Crockett, Clark, & Robbins, 2009).
Tryptophan Depletion Procedure
Participants were assigned to receive either the tryptophan de-
pleting drink or the placebo mixture on the first session in a
double-blind, approximately counterbalanced order. In the trypto-
phan depletion procedure, tryptophan was depleted by ingestion of
a liquid amino acid load that did not contain tryptophan but did
include other large neutral amino acids (LNAAs); the placebo
mixture was identical to the tryptophan depletion mixture, except
it contained 3g of tryptophan. Details of the procedure have been
described previously (Crockett et al., 2008). To obtain a continu-
ous measure of tryptophan depletion across subjects, we calculated
the change, from baseline to pretest, in the ratio of tryptophan to
other large neutral amino acids (TRP:LNAA ratio) in the plasma.
Reduction of the TRP:LNAA ratio is a proxy index of tryptophan
depletion in the brain, because tryptophan competes with other
large neutral amino acids for transport across the blood–brain
barrier. The tryptophan depletion procedure caused significant
decreases in the TRP:LNAA ratios, averaging 85%.
The Ultimatum Game
Participants played 48 one-shot UGs via computer interface. To
enhance the credibility of the UG task, participants were told that
they were part of a large ongoing study in which they would be
playing the role of responder with volunteers who had submitted
their offers previously. In addition, they were told they would have
the opportunity to play the role of proposer with volunteers who
would participate in the future, if they would allow their photo-
graph to be taken and used in future sessions, and submit proposals
for 12 different stake sizes. Four participants declined having their
photograph taken. In reality, there were no actual proposers, and
participants’ proposals were not used beyond their function as a
cover story. Before the game started, the experimenter required a
verbal confirmation that the participant understood the game.
Participants were told that they would receive the financial out-
comes from two trials that would be randomly selected at the end
of the game. During each trial, participants viewed sequentially a
photograph of the proposer (1,500 ms), the amount of the stake
(total pie to be shared) (1,500 ms), and the amount of the offer
(3,000 ms). Participants responded to each offer by pressing one of
two buttons (labeled “accept” and “reject”) while the offer was on
the screen. On each session, participants played 48 games, each
with a different proposer. Proposer identities were randomly
matched with offers. There were 8 fair offers, ranging from 40–
50% of the stake; 8 medium offers, ranging from 27–33% of the
stake; and 8 unfair offers, ranging from 18–22% of the stake, each
presented twice. Participants received identical offers at each ses-
sion, but the order of offers was randomized to disguise this. On
different trials, the same monetary amount could appear as a large
percentage of the total stake and therefore “fair,” or as a small
percentage of the total stake and therefore “unfair.” This design
allowed us to observe independent effects of tryptophan depletion
on responding to different levels of fairness versus different levels
of monetary reward. The critical dependent measures were the
proportions of offers rejected at each level of fairness and at each
level of monetary reward. The main effects of offer size and offer
fairness on rejection rates in this sample are reported elsewhere
(Crockett et al., 2008).
Delay Discounting Task
The task consisted of 31 hypothetical choices between “£m
today” and “£m in d days,” where m  m, m ranged from 11 to
80, m ranged from 25 to 85, and d ranged from 7 to 186. Subjects
were instructed to indicate which option they would prefer. The
first 4 choices were practice trials and excluded from the analysis.
Choice data for each subject were fit to a hyperbolic discount
function using the procedure described in Kirby, Petry, and Bickel
(1999). The dependent measure of interest was the discount pa-
rameter k, or steepness of the hyperbolic discount function. The
task yielded three separate values of k, for small (£25–35), me-
dium (£50–60), and large (£75–85) rewards. To examine the
relationship between delay discounting and altruistic punishment,
we used the average k value (mean of small, medium, and large k
values). Larger values of k denote stronger preference for small
immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards (i.e., impulsive
choice). Raw discount parameters were natural log transformed
before analysis.
General Procedure
Participants completed two separate sessions, separated by at
least 1 week, and were asked to abstain from food, alcohol, and
caffeine from midnight before each session. Upon arrival between
8 and 10:30 am, participants completed a mood rating question-
naire, gave a blood sample, and ingested either the placebo or the
tryptophan-depleting amino acid drink. After a resting period of
5.5 hr, participants completed a second mood rating question-
naire, gave a second blood sample, and completed the test battery,
which included the UG and the temporal discounting task. Self-
report mood was assessed at three other time points during the
battery. Tryptophan depletion did not reliably affect mood, as
described previously (Crockett et al., 2008).
Results
Impulsive Choice Is Positively Correlated With
Altruistic Punishment in the Ultimatum Game
To test whether individual differences in impulsive choice were
related to individual differences in altruistic punishment, we cor-
related performance on the delay-discounting task (collapsed
across session and reward size) with rejection rates of fair, medium
and unfair offers in the UG (collapsed across session). Across
subjects, impulsive choice was positively correlated with rejection
rates of unfair offers (r  .482, p  .023; Figure 1), but not
medium offers (r  .212, p  .313) or fair offers (r  .060, p 
.791). In other words, individuals who preferred smaller immediate
rewards to larger delayed rewards were more likely to reject unfair
offers in the UG. This relationship held for both the placebo
857 ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT AND IMPULSIVE CHOICEsession and the tryptophan depletion session (see supplementary
results).
Lowering Serotonin Increases Impulsive Choice in
Delay-Discounting
We next tested the effect of tryptophan depletion on delay-
discounting of small, medium and large rewards. We conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA with treatment and reward size as
within-subjects factors, and degree of biochemical tryptophan de-
pletion (the TRP:LNAA ratio) as a covariate. This analysis
revealed a marginally significant main effect of treatment (F(1,
18)  4.264, p  .054,  ´p
2  0.192) and a significant interaction
between treatment and TRP:LNAA ratios (F(1, 18)  9.399, p 
.007,  ´p
2  0.343). Impulsive choice on the delay-discounting task
was increased after tryptophan depletion relative to placebo, to the
extent that tryptophan depletion reduced serotonin levels. There
was a significant positive correlation between the magnitude of
biochemical tryptophan depletion and the increase in impulsive
choice on the discounting task after tryptophan depletion relative
to placebo (r  .572, p  .008; Figure 2). That is, individuals
showing the strongest biochemical response to the depletion pro-
cedure also showed larger increases in impulsive choice following
the depletion procedure.
Parallel Effects of Lowering Serotonin on Impulsive
Choice and Altruistic Punishment
Previously, we reported that lowering serotonin in this sample
increased altruistic punishment in the UG (Crockett et al., 2008).
In this final analysis, we examined whether the effect of trypto-
phan depletion on impulsive choice in the delay-discounting task
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Figure 1. Collapsed across session, impulsive choice on the delay discounting task (log-transformed discount
parameter) was significantly and positively correlated with costly punishment in the UG (percent of unfair offers
rejected), r  0.518, p  0.023.
h
o
i
c
e
0.8
1.2
05 7 2
p
u
l
s
i
v
e
 
c
h
0.4
r = 0.572
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
i
m
p
04
0.0
C
h
a
n
-0.8
-0.4
00 2 0 00 2 00 4 00 6 00 8 01 -0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
Magnitude of TRP depletion 
Figure 2. Reductions in plasma tryptophan (TRP) were significantly and positively correlated with increases
in impulsive choice on the delay discounting task (log-transformed discount parameter) after tryptophan
depletion, r  0.572, p  0.008.
858 CROCKETT ET AL.was correlated with the effect of tryptophan depletion on altruistic
punishment in the UG. Across subjects, increases in impulsive
choice resulting from tryptophan depletion were significantly and
positively correlated with increases in rejection rates of unfair
offers resulting from tryptophan depletion (r  .489, p  .021;
Figure 3), and increases in rejection rates of medium offers (r 
.521, p  .013) but not increases in rejection rates of fair offers
(r  .256, p  .250).
As impulsive choice was generally related to altruistic punish-
ment across individuals, it is plausible that the discounting of
delayed rewards represents an underlying process that plays a
causal role in determining individual responses to unfair offers in
the UG. That is, perhaps responders who reject a high proportion
of unfair offers in the UG do so because they more strongly
discount the delayed monetary benefits of accepting the offers
relative to the immediate satisfaction of rejecting the offers. As
lowering serotonin increased impulsive choice on the discounting
task, one potential explanation for our finding that lowering sero-
tonin increased altruistic punishment in the UG could be that
increases in impulsive choice played a mediating role. To formally
test the indirect effect of changes in impulsive choice after tryp-
tophan depletion on changes in rejection rates of unfair offers after
tryptophan depletion, we used the bias-corrected bootstrap method
(with n  1,000 bootstrap resamples) as outlined in Preacher and
Hayes (2008). This method does not assume a normal distribution
of data and is recommended for small sample sizes (Shrout &
Bolger, 2002). The true, indirect effect of depletion-induced
changes in impulsive choice on unfair offer rejection rates was
estimated to be between 0.1008 and 15.1921, with 95% confidence
interval. Zero falls outside this confidence interval, supporting the
conclusion that the indirect effect of changes in impulsive choice
on unfair offer rejection rates is significantly different from zero
(p  .05, two-tailed). These results indicate that depletion-induced
increases in impulsive choice were significantly related to
depletion-induced increases in altruistic punishment, indepen-
dently from the effect of serotonin on both measures. In other
words, serotonin depletion may shift preferences toward the im-
mediate satisfaction of punishing unfairness and away from the
delayed monetary reward that results from accepting an offer.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that individual differences in impulsive
choice predict altruistic punishment behavior in the UG. Prefer-
ences for small immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards
were associated with a stronger tendency to punish proposers who
made unfair offers. These findings contradict the idea that altruistic
punishment in the UG is an exercise in self-control; if this were the
case, we should have found the opposite relationship between
individual differences in impulsive choice and individual differ-
ences in altruistic punishment behavior.
The fact that temporarily lowering serotonin increased both
impulsive choice and altruistic punishment in the UG (Crockett et
al., 2008) further supports our claim that altruistic punishment
reflects the absence, rather than the presence of self-control. More-
over, the effects of lowering serotonin on impulsive choice and
altruistic punishment were correlated across individuals, suggest-
ing that common neural mechanisms underlie these processes.
Although our measure of impulsive choice employed hypothetical
as opposed to real monetary rewards, past research has shown that
hypothetical monetary rewards are discounted in a similar manner
to real monetary rewards (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Madden,
Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003).
Our findings imply that altruistic punishment behavior is an
impulsive emotional reaction to perceived unfairness rather than a
deliberative, goal-directed process. In line with this hypothesis,
others have reported that responders are faster to reject than accept
unfair offers (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005), and
time pressure increases rejection rates in the UG (Sutter, Kocher,
& Strauss, 2003). However, we do not mean to suggest that
altruistic punishment is necessarily “irrational”; utility in the UG
may well extend beyond the material value of the offers. Many
studies support the view that punishing noncooperators is intrin-
sically rewarding. When responders’ decisions impact only on
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859 ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT AND IMPULSIVE CHOICEthemselves (i.e., the proposer will be paid even if the responder
rejects), responders almost never reject unfair offers (Bolton &
Zwick, 1995). The dorsal striatum, a brain region implicated in
instrumental reward anticipation (O’Doherty et al., 2004), is acti-
vated when people decide whether and how much to punish norm
violators in the trust game; people with greater activity in this
region are willing to incur higher personal costs to punish, sug-
gesting that the dorsal striatum encodes the personal satisfaction
derived from enforcing punishment (de Quervain et al., 2004).
Furthermore, watching unfair players receive electric shocks acti-
vates the ventral striatum (Singer et al., 2006), a region implicated
in passive reward prediction (O’Doherty et al., 2004); ventral
striatal activity was positively correlated with expressed desire for
revenge (Singer et al., 2006).
In most economic games used to study altruistic punishment
behavior, the emotional satisfaction derived from punishing (e.g.,
rejecting an unfair offer) is immediate, while the monetary benefit
of not punishing (e.g., accepting an unfair offer) is delayed until
the end of the experiment. This suggests a potential mechanism
underlying the relationship between serotonin depletion, impulsive
choice and altruistic punishment: perhaps the tendency to engage
in altruistic punishment arises from the tendency to favor imme-
diate rewards over delayed rewards. This interpretation is bolstered
by our finding that depletion-induced increases in impulsive
choice had significant effects on altruistic punishment independent
from the effects of serotonin depletion on altruistic punishment.
A plausible alternative explanation for the effects of serotonin
depletion on impulsive choice and altruistic punishment concerns
the hypothesis that serotonin is involved in assigning aversive
value (Daw et al., 2002). According to this hypothesis, depleting
serotonin could make the monetary losses resulting from rejecting
offers seem less aversive, thus making rejection less ‘costly.’
However, we can rule out this explanation for the current data: in
the same subjects, serotonin depletion had no effect on behavioral
adjustment in line with punishment contingencies, indicating that
serotonin is not critical for the assignment of aversive value
(Crockett et al., 2009).
Impulsivity and self-control are complex multidimensional con-
structs, and the current study examined just one facet: impulsive
choice, or preference for small immediate rewards over larger delayed
rewards. This facet of impulsivity is highly relevant for the decision-
making context of the UG (Reynolds et al., 2006), although we have
not captured the entire construct of impulsivity with this measure.
Some have even argued that this measure does not solely measure
impulsive choice (Sozou, 1998); however, there is evidence that
impulsive choice correlates with other varieties of impulsivity (Kirby
& Finch, 2010), and has high ecological validity as a measure of
self-control (Bickel et al., 2007; Petry, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Weller,
Cook, Avsar, & Cox, 2008). We did examine another facet of impul-
sivity in this sample of volunteers: motor impulsivity as measured by
the Go/No-go task. We reported previously that serotonin depletion
did not influence motor impulsivity, consistent with previous studies
(Crockett et al., 2008); in addition, individual differences in motor
impulsivity were not correlated with individual differences in altruis-
tic punishment in the UG (M.J. Crockett, unpublished observations).
This suggests that only certain aspects of impulsivity are relevant for
altruistic punishment. Future studies might examine whether other
aspects of impulsivity and self-control (e.g., risk-taking, future orien-
tation) influence altruistic punishment, and under what circumstances.
Where does the impulse to punish unfairness originate? The
existence of altruistic punishment in nonhuman species is contro-
versial, but there is some evidence that primates punish noncoop-
erative peers with retaliative aggression (Silk, 2005). The link
between altruistic punishment and aggression is further supported
by the fact that they share underlying neural mechanisms. Both
aggressive responses to provocation and altruistic punishment of
noncooperators are associated with activity in the medial prefron-
tal cortex (mPFC) (de Quervain et al., 2004; Lotze, Veit, Anders,
& Birbaumer, 2007); and lowering serotonin increases both reac-
tive aggression (Cleare & Bond, 1995) and altruistic punishment
(Crockett et al., 2008).
Altruistic punishment is just one example of a behavior that
promotes cooperation within groups- that is, a “prosocial” behav-
ior. Notably, cooperation itself has also been linked to both im-
pulsive choice and serotonin function in humans. In the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma, individuals who choose impulsively on the
delay-discounting task are less likely to cooperate (Yi, Johnson, &
Bickel, 2005); and lowering serotonin with tryptophan depletion
reduces cooperation in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (Wood,
Rilling, Sanfey, Bhagwagar, & Rogers, 2006). Comparing these
findings to the present data, it appears that impulsive choice is
positively correlated with one type of pro-social behavior (altru-
istic punishment in the UG), but negatively correlated with another
type of pro-social behavior (cooperation in the prisoner’s di-
lemma). This suggests that serotonin does not necessarily function
to ensure group harmony, but is more related to impulsivity and
aggression that are each capable of increasing or decreasing group
harmony depending on conditions.
Taken together with other studies in this area, the current study
highlights the complexity of the psychological and neural mech-
anisms underlying prosocial behavior in humans, and suggests that
prosocial behavior may not be a unitary construct. Social norm
adherence and enforcement may be governed by multiple indepen-
dent neural systems: an abstract, rule-based system based in
DLPFC, which represents fairness goals (Knoch et al., 2006); and
a spiteful, emotion-driven system including the mPFC, insula and
striatum, which represent the immediately reinforcing aspects of
sanctioning norm violators (de Quervain et al., 2004; Koenigs &
Tranel, 2007; Sanfey et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2006; Tabibnia et
al., 2008). Environmental factors, such as food availability or
chronic stress, may impact the functioning of these systems
through their influence on the levels of neuromodulators like
serotonin (Crockett, 2009). Defining the influence of neuromodu-
lators on altruistic punishment may therefore enhance our under-
standing of how context shapes human social behavior.
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